Eficient schemes for key predistribution and shared-key discovery play a vital role in security and eficiency of pairwise key establishment an sensor networks. In this paper, we propose a scheme for key predistribution using hash-chain and subsequent shared-key discove y. We show potential active attacks on sensor networks due to key predistribution which can have severer consequences as compared to attucks described in existing proposals. We also show that as compared to the existing schemes, our scheme is more resilient to these active attacks.
Introduction
Sensor networks are composed of a large number of low-power sensor devices. For secure communication among the sensors, pairwise keys are needed to be established between each pair of communicating sensors. Recent proposals 11, 21 use Random Key Predistribution (RKP) to achieve the goal. In RKP schemes, each sensor is preIoaded with certain number of keys. The sensors can communicate with each other secureiy if they share at least one key. The probability of two sensors sharing at least one key is proportional to the number of preinstalled keys in each sensor.
,
The wireless nature of communication among sensors makes sensor networks vulnerable to passive and active attacks. Also, for many applications, the lowcost sensors are deployed in unattended environments which make them physically insecure. Due to the low-cost design, the sensors are not considered to be tamper-proof devices. Physical capture of sensors may lead to severe security problems. One of the goals of a secure scheme for pairwise key establishment is to minimize the effect of physical node capture in sensor networks.
In this paper, we introduce a scheme for RKP and subsequent shared-key discovery. The main idea of our scheme is to define RINK (Relationship between the node I D aNd the Keys possessed by each sensor). We use node id of each sensor to determine the keys to be preinstalled in that sensor. The RINK alleviates the security risks due to node capture by restricting the ability of an attacker to fabricate fake sensor nodes. Further, unlike the existing schemes in [l] and [2], this design obviates the need for transmission of all key identifiers during shared-key discovery phase; and unlike the scheme proposed in [3] , this design does not require computationally expensive operations for sharedkey discovery.
Background of RKP Schemes

Phases in RKP Schemes
Key predistribution phase: A centralized key server first generates a large key pool offline. Keys from this key pool are distributed as follows: 1. Assign a unique node identifier or key ring identifer to each sensor 2. Select m different keys for each sensor from the key pool to form a key ring 3. Load the node identifier and the key ring into memory of the sensor.
Sensor deployment phase: The sensors are randomly picked and uniformly distributed in a large area. Typically, the number of sensors in communication range (neighbors) of a sensor (n') is much smaller than the total number of deployed sensors ( N ) . Shared-key discovery phase: During the sharedkey discovery (SKD) phase, each sensor attempts to find other sensors in its communication range. A set of neighbors ( W ) is maintained by each sensor. It then attempts to discover shared key(s) with them. Each sensor builds a key gmph (see Definition 1) according to its view of the network. Next, each sensor shares its key graph with other sensors and updates its key graph according to the key graphs from other sensors. Pairwise key establishment phase: If a sensor discovers shared key(s) with a given neighbor, the shared key(s) can be used as their pairwise key(s). If a sensor does not share required key(s) with a given neighbor, the sensor uses the key graph built during SKD phase to find a key path (see Definition 2) to set up the pairwise key for future communication.
Definition 1 (Key graph) A key graph maintained by node i is defined as Gi = (V, , Ei) where, V, 
Related Work
The first P-RKP scheme was proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [I], and we refer to it as the basic scheme. The proposals that followed the basic scheme suggested improvements in terms of security. Chan et al. proposed the q-composite scheme in [2] . In this scheme, the shared-key threshold is set to a variable q. To form a secure link between two sensors, the scheme requires them to share at least q keys. The scheme proposed by Du et al. The Grid-based scheme is equivalent to the scheme proposed in [3] in that it uses polynomials instead of key spaces. Recently, Peitro et al. presented a pseudorandom key predistribution in [TI. This scheme uses a pseudwandom function for predistribution of keys.
RINK-RKP
In this section, we introduce RINK-RKP, a new scheme for random key predistribution and subsequent shared-key discovery in sensor networks.
K e y Predistribution
The key predistribution phase for RKP scheme introduced in [l] and adopted by Chan et al. [2] does not define any relationship between the node i d and the keys possessed by each sensor.
The main idea behind our approach is to define a relationship between the node id and the keys possessed by each sensor while maintaining the required randomness in choice of keys. Our scheme requires the key predistribution phase to first choose a unique identifier for e x h sensor node. To determine the keys to be installed in the sensor, we use a secure one-way hash function as defined in 181. It may be noted that a.ny pseudo-random function which can produce output uniformly distributed in a given range for given input set can be used. Before describing the use of one-way hash functions for RINK-RKP, we summarize the notations used in the rest part of the paper as follows: N is the total number of sensors to be preloaded, n is the total number of sensors to be deployed for a sensor network and For key predistribution in RINK-RKP, we require key server to first generate keys ( Y ' s ) and their identifiers (k's) in a key pool of size P. The pseudo code in Procedure 1 shows our key predistribution method.
This scheme generates a chain of practically random numbers by taking the unique node id as the seed. In turn, it binds the node i d with the set of keys the node possesses. This procedure is followed for each of the N sensors to be preloaded. By including the PrevKey and node id along with the SHA-1 [9] output as input to the next hash operation, we make the probability of merging of chains of two different sensors negligible.
Shared-Key Discovery Scheme
The shared-key discovery (SKD) phase is the next phase after deployment of the sensors. In this phase, each sensor attempts to find other sensors in its range and discovers possible shared-keys with them.
As shown in Procedure 2, in RINK-RKP, a sensor, say s i , initiates this phase by broadcasting its identi- random capture assumption is too weak. The attacker can purposely attack certain area or a group of sensors. Thus, an attacker can purposely locate and capture the sensors which can give more information about the sensor network. For example, in P-RKP scheme, each sensor broadcasts its list of keys. An attacker can selectively attack a sensor that possesses the most number of keys that are not already compromised. In the best case for the attacker, for a key pool of size P and the m keys in each sensor, the attack can compromise all communication links by capturing [P/ml sensors. In practice, an attacker can inspect all keys possessed by sensors and find the minimal cover set which contains the minimal number of sensors that can cover the maximum number of keys in the key pool. Alternatively, a less powerful attacker can use heuristic technique to choose the next node to capture. However, due to the purely random selection of keys in P-RKP schemes, the attacker does not gain significantly more information using selective capture attack as compared to random capture. Similarly, for RINK-RKP, the gain due to selective capture attack over random capture attack is not significant as the keys are practically randomiy selected for each node.
As compared to the P-RKP schemes, the selective attack on SK-RKP scheme can cause severer problems. This is due the fact that in SK-RKP scheme, the nodes derive a shared key if they share a key space. As the number of key spaces is generally much smaller than number of individual keys used in P-RKP to derive a shared key, the attacker has better selection criterion. In SK-RKP scheme, each sensor broadcasts its node id and the key-space ids in order to discover shared-key with its neighbors. At the same time, the node id and
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Figure 1: Selective node capture attack on SK-RKP scheme [3] with m = 100, pconnect = 0.432 key-space ids can be extremely helpful to the attacker to launch selective attack. The attacker can selectively capture the sensors that possess keys within the same key space. Once X + 1 sensors in a key space are compromised, all the keys in that key space are compromised. In this fashion, an attacker can incrementally capture the sensors that use same key space. Since sensors possess keys from more than one key space, the number of sensors required to be captured to compromise subsequent key spaces is less. We use c(i) to represent the average number of additional sensors to be captured in order to compromise a key space when i -1 key spaces an! already compromised. In order to compromise the first key space, the attacker needs to capture at least A + 1 nodes (i.e. c(1) = X + 1).
Since each sensor is allocated T key spaces (7 2 Z ) , a captured node also uses an uncompromised key space with probability p' = 5. Thus, to compromise ith key space, we have 
Active attacks using captured nodes
Since sensors are low-cost devices and operate in unattended environment for many applications, they cannot be considered tamper-resistant. Under some practical assumptions about capabilities of the attacker, we now describe two related active attacks on sensor networks due to captured nodes.
Node replication attack:
In this attack, the attacker captures a sensor and clones it as per requirement. Since the attacker is assumed to have the ability to listen to the traffic in the network, the attacker can deploy the clones in the other parts of the network.
Due to lack of a-priori knowledge of post-deployment configuration, the uncompromised sensors in the other parts of the network cannot detect the cloned sensor as an anomalous sensor. This attack can have severer consequences a5 compared to the passive listening attacks on links between uncompromised nodes.
Node fabrication attack:
In this attack, the attacker captures sensors and fabricates fake sensors using the information gathered from captured nodes. Similar to the node replication attack, the attacker can deploy the fabricated nodes in the parts of the network where the original sensor i s not present. The uncompromised sensors in the network cannot detect the fabricated nodes as anomalous nodes as long as they can have expected communication with them. This attack is severer as compared to node replication attack as the attacker may have enough information to fabricate multiple sensors in order to inject, sink, modify, and reroute the sensed data.
Since node replication is a special case of node fabrication, we analyze the schemes for node fabrication attack in general. The basic aim of the attacker launching this attack is to fabricate fake nodes and deploy them in the existing system. The more the number of uncompromised nodes that can be used by the fake nodes to get connected to the network, the faster the attacker can take control over the network. Fig. 2 shows the node fabrication attack on different schemes. In the P-RKP schemes, by capturing less than 10 nodes the attacker can gather enough information to fabricate fake nodes that can establish connection with most of the uncompromised nodes. This is possible in P-RKP because there is no defined relationship between the node id and the keys possessed by each sensor. By capturing only a few nodes, the attacker can fabricate fake nodes with identity of his choice with the same set of keys. For example, by c a p turing two nodes, the attacker can fabricate and deploy approximately (2,") fake nodes. These nodes possess valid keys and hence cannot be detected. Unlike P-RKP schemes, the SK-FXP scheme and our scheme bind the possessed keys with the node i d ofsensors. As a result, the attacker has to capture significantly more number of sensors t o achieve the same goal in SK-RKP and our scheme. In SK-RKP scheme, the attacker can incrementally compromise key spaces and fabricate fake sensors using the compromised key space. Equation (1) can be used to determine the number of additional sensors required to be captured in order to compromise each additional key space. In our scheme, in order for a fabricated node t o get connect to the network via an uncompromised node, the node needs to satisfy the following conditions: 1. It should share required number of keys (q) with the uncompromised node. 2. Given that the first condition is satisfied, all the shared-keys must be already known t o the attacker. The probability that a fabricated node will satisfy these conditions with x nodes already captured can be computed as:
Where, c, = [l -(1 -3 1 ' P Where a: is the number of captured nodes, [l - (1 -?)"I is the fraction of keys that are compromised due to capture of x nodes, and C, is the number of keys compromised due to capture of x nodes.
As shown in Fig. 2 , our scheme performs significantly better than P-RKP schemes. As compared to SK-RKP scheme, our scheme provides more robust security after a smal1 threshold. As compared to the existing P-RKP schemes that use unstructured key pool, the ability of our scheme to resist node fabrication attack is significantly more. Unlike in P-RKP schemes, the binding between the node id and the possessed keys in SK-RKP scheme and our scheme largely restricts the ability of the attacker to fabricate fake nodes with identities of his choice.
Conclusion
In this paper, we identify a limitation in one of the existing schemes and propose a new scheme for RKP in sensor networks. In all existing proposals, the s e curity analysis is based on random capture of sensors. By analyzing the robustness of SK-RKP scheme under selective node capture attack, we show that the assumption of random node capture is weak in practice. Also, we analyze active attacks OR sensor networks due to node capture and compare our scheme with the existing schemes under these attacks.
